This study examines whether facets of corporate governance (board size, proportion of independent directors on the board, board committees, and Big 4 auditor) promote the voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital in annual reports in Australia and New Zealand and whether this is country dependent. Data was collected from OSIRIS and annual reports with disclosure detected through a rigorous electronic word search approach. Statistical testing with OLS regression followed. The presence of nomination committees and a majority of independent directors on the board were found to be significant positive predictors of intellectual capital disclosure in both countries, and larger board sizes in Australian companies enhanced intellectual capital disclosure. These results concur with resource dependency and stakeholder theoretical arguments.
INTRODUCTION
Australia and New Zealand (NZ) are two developed OECD South Pacific nations committed to becoming part of the developing world-wide "knowledge economy" (Barnes and McClure, 2009; Whiting and Miller, 2008) . For knowledge rich organisations within these countries, it is the intellectual capital (IC) rather than the physical and financial capital, which is deemed to be a key source of competitive advantage and shareholder value (Tayles et al., 2007) . Empirical studies have shown that IC has a positive effect on performance and wealth (e.g. Clarke et al., 2011) .
However, the growing relevance of IC has not been adequately reflected by international reporting standard setters (Gerpott et al., 2008) and IC is underestimated in financial statements due to the existence of restrictive accounting criteria. As a result, the usefulness and the relevance of financial statements have been challenged (Abeysekera, 2010) . Voluntary IC disclosure (ICD) is seen as an influential supplement to financial statements.
Concurrently with increasing IC importance, organisations worldwide have suffered from a rash of accounting scandals. In response, most developed economies have been actively reviewing and improving their regulatory frameworks, in particular, corporate governance (CG), transparency and disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001) .
As a consequence, two separate areas of research have grown in parallel over this period. Firstly, ICD studies have investigated the influence of corporate characteristics such as firm size and age, technological intensity of firm's industry, ownership concentration and leverage on ICD (e.g. Oliveira et al., 2006) . Secondly, other studies have focussed on CG's responsibility for financial and physical capital (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001 ) and the effects of CG characteristics on financial disclosure (R. Lim, 2011) .
But there is still much to learn about the intersection of these two streams of knowledge; that is, the effects that CG has on voluntary ICD (Li et al., 2008) . Only a few studies have focussed (fully or partially) on this investigation, such as Li et al. Understanding this relationship is of significant interest to regulators, investors, prospective and current directors and other aligned stakeholders. Accordingly, this study examines the impact of CG on ICD in Australia and NZ in 2009 . This study investigates six CG variables: board size, board composition, presence of audit, remuneration and nomination committees, and engagement of a Big 4 auditor. It is conducted within Australia and NZ as both countries have focused on creating a "knowledge economy", the countries have close economic relations and commonality in accounting professional bodies, both lack a specific IC disclosure standard making the majority of IC disclosure voluntary, and both countries have suffered accounting scandals and have made various changes to the CG environment over recent years. Due to the stronger and earlier adoption of CG principles in Australia, it is expected that the relationship between CG and ICD will be stronger for Australian firms compared to NZ firms.
The paper makes three contributions to the literature. Firstly it adds to the literature linking CG with ICD, not only in two poorly studied countries in this regard but also as a comparative study across the two jurisdictions of Australia and NZ (Dumay and Cai, 2014) . Secondly it argues the relationships from stakeholder and resource dependency theoretical viewpoints rather than the more commonly used agency theory. Thirdly, it combines manual content analysis and reliability checking with an Australasian-focussed computer-based word search (Dumay and Cai, 2014) which provides an increased sample size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature and develops the hypotheses. The method used is described in Section 3. The results are then outlined in Section 4 with concluding comments in Section 5.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Intellectual Capital and its Disclosure
IC is complex and difficult to define (Nerantzidis et al., 2013 (Sveiby, 1997) .
Structural capital refers to the knowledge embedded in organisational structures and process and includes intellectual property such as patents and copyrights, and infrastructure assets such as corporate culture and management philosophy, policies and procedures. Relational capital is more externally focussed, concerned with the ability of the firm to interact positively with other business players so as to enhance human and structural capital, leading to wealth creation. It consists of an organisation's relationships with customers and suppliers, brand names and reputation (Guthrie and Petty, 2000) . The human capital category highlights the employee-based value drivers of a firm, such as employee knowledge and skill (Gerpott et al., 2008) .
Developed countries have experienced a shift away from traditional commodities and manufacturing-based sectors towards more intangible-based output (Guthrie and Petty, 2000) . However most IC items do not meet the restrictive requirements for accounting recognition, or are not fiscally measurable and this has led to a deterioration in the usefulness of financial information (Oliveira et al., 2006 ).
Explanations for ICD
ICD is beneficial for a myriad of reasons. It mitigates the information asymmetry problem and has positive effects on a firm's reputation and the trust and confidence that stakeholders have in firm's management (Vergauwen et al., 2007) . The firm's perceived risk is reduced through this more open disclosure policy as investors have a greater insight into the firm's value creation processes and the economic risks attached to a firm's shares, and therefore the cost of capital is reduced (Orens et al., 2009 ). Conversely, companies do incur significant proprietary costs in voluntarily disclosing information and may regard such disclosure as a service to shareholders, investors and analysts (Vergauwen et al., 2007) . Costs include those of gathering and analysing IC-related data, the costs of revealing strategic information to shareholders (Ax and Marton, 2008) , and the potential exposure of firms and auditors to legal claims and misunderstandings. The ultimate decision about whether or not to disclose will be the result of a cost-benefit trade-off.
A number of theoretical perspectives have been used to explain why firms voluntarily disclose information . Some of the more prevalent are described briefly below.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract under which one party (the principal) engages another party (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf. Agency costs result from mitigation efforts to counteract the effects of the self-interest of the agent. Disclosures can help alleviate agency costs by giving owners more information about the company (Schneider and Samkin, 2008) .
Not disclosing information regarding intangibles, will lead to asymmetry between insiders in the company and users of the financial statements, which makes a company more vulnerable to insider trading. To prevent this from happening, companies benefit from the disclosure of IC-related information thus mitigating information asymmetry .
Stakeholder theory's basic premise is that the firm's continued existence is contingent on the support of its stakeholders and it therefore a firm's management will engage in and report on activities that are expected by stakeholders (Omran and ElGalfy, 2014) . In terms of ICD, stakeholder theory suggests that businesses will 'elect to voluntarily disclose information about their intellectual, social and environmental performance, over and above mandatory requirements' (Guthrie and Petty, 2000, p.14) in order to appease and manage their stakeholders (Abhayawansa and Azim, 2014).
Corporate governance and the link to ICD
'Corporate Governance is the system by which business organisations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, and spells out the procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance' (OECD, 1999, p.3). Recent corporate scandals have cemented CG as an important research topic (S. Lim et al., 2007) .
Key roles of directors include controlling and monitoring the organisation and providing resources and advice to management (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003 On the other hand, resource dependency theory (RDT) characterizes corporations as open systems, dependent on contingencies in the external environment, but able to make strategic choices to pursue their goals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Corporate boards manage external dependencies by bringing important resources and benefits to the firm, such as advice and counsel, legitimacy, and increased communication channels to external organisations.
These resources can bring competitive advantage to the firm (Barney and Arikan, 2005) . Twenty percent of directors in Australasia say that strategic advice is the strongest skill that they bring to the board (Groysberg and Bell, 2012) .
Accordingly this study argues that CG influences on ICD by the firm are predominantly located in RDT and stakeholder theory. Directors bring resources to the firm which enhance IC (Abeysekera, 2010) such as superior knowledge or awareness of IC, advice to management and assistance with IC strategy formulation, and connections to knowledgeable persons and networks. As well as showing adherence to legal human capital requirements, disclosing IC will enhance the firm's reputation and lead to better relations with external stakeholders such as bankers, investors and suppliers, and increase its competitive advantage (Barney and Arikan, 2005) .
Both Australia and NZ follow a 'principle-based' approach to CG in order to avoid overregulation (S. Lim et al., 2007) . In 2003 the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) released ten broad principles of good corporate governance in order to establish an effective CG structure (Australian Securities Exchange, 2003). The best practice recommendations are not mandatory, but ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 requires all listed companies to disclose in their annual report the extent to which they comply with each of the recommendations, and also to provide explanations when these recommendations are not followed 11 . NZ moved a year later. In 2004, the Corporate Governance Best Practice Code and amendments incorporating CG regulation into the NZ Exchange Listing Rules entered into force on a "comply and explain" basis (OECD, 2004) . Also in 2004, the NZ Securities Commission published "Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines", consisting of nine principles and guidelines for maintaining a high standard of CG. Compliance with the code and principles is not mandatory.
Entities are however, expected to disclose in their annual report whether and how they have complied with the principles (OECD, 2004) .
CG is composed of several facets such as board size and structure and there are a limited number of 11 Amended in 2010 and 2014 (after this study's data) and now consist of eight central principles. Larger listed firms must now meet some mandatory requirements (e.g. structure and disclosure requirements of the audit committee) (Australian Securities Exchange, 2014).
studies that have investigated their relationships with ICD. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found that European biotechnology firms with larger numbers of independent directors (board composition) disclosed more internal structural information, but CEO duality negatively impacted on the disclosure of forward-looking disclosures. Using a sample of 100 UK listed firms, Li et al. (2008) found support for a positive relationship between board composition, ownership structure, audit committee size and frequency of its meetings and ICD, however found no support for the influence of CEO duality. Haji and Ghazali (2013) , in their longitudinal study with 51 large publicly listed Malaysian firms observed significant positive relationships between board size and the proportion of independent directors on the extent and quality of ICD. Similarly, Abeysekera (2010) found that Kenyan firms (n=52) with larger boards disclosed more tactical internal capital and strategic human capital. Using the relevant literature, six hypotheses have been developed. The study does not attempt to examine all possible facets of CG, but rather focus on those predominantly related to RDT and stakeholder theory arguments.
Adopting a RDT perspective, a larger board size will bring wider experience and a greater diversity of skill sets and perspectives to the board which compensate for individual deficiencies (Abeysekera, 2010) . This greater human capital may in turn encourage a greater investment in other human capital which is a strategic resource for future earnings and value creation (Massingham and Tam, 2015; Roos and Roos, 1997), and will also enhance relationship capital. To disseminate this IC information to the wider variety of stakeholders that the larger board represents, the firm will engage in more voluntary disclosure. Although larger boards may suffer from poorer coordination, more freerider problems and increased difficulty in coming to decisions (R. Lim, 2011 ), this appears to be outweighed by the positive benefits of a larger board. Hidalgo et al. (2011) , Haji and Ghazali (2013) and Abeysekera (2010) all found a positive relationship between board size and ICD. However Hidalgo et al. (2011) found that board sizes over 15 had a negative effect on ICD but this is not expected to be a concern in this study as much smaller board sizes are observed in Australasia (R. Lim, 2011).
H 1 : There is a positive relationship between board size and the level of voluntary ICD.
Boards can be composed of independent nonexecutive directors and executive management directors. RDT advocates for more independent directors on the board, arguing that they provide 'wider expertise, prestige and contacts and play a key role in influencing disclosure' (Li et al., 2008, p.139) . Extending this argument to IC, it suggests that the wider experience of non-executive directors will encourage management to take a 'disclosure position beyond an uncritical prescription to norms, to a more proactive position, reflecting the value relevance of intellectual capital to stakeholders' (Li et al., 2008, p.139). S. Lim et al. (2007) found that more independent boards of Australian firms provide more disclosure of forward-looking and strategic information. ASX recommends a majority of independent directors on the board (Australian Securities Exchange, 2003).
Alternatively, executive directors' superior knowledge of the firm might lead to better decision making (Christensen et al., 2010) and therefore fewer independent directors on the board would be expected to be associated with superior financial performance and thus greater ICD (Li et CG codes of best practice highlight the importance of the board committee as an effective CG mechanism. Under an agency theory perspective, the establishment of committees improves internal control and thus is regarded as an effective monitoring device for improving disclosure quality (Ho and Wong, 2001 ). Using an RDT lens, the committees provide specialist skills and enhancement of IC and effective decision making.
Seventy-two percent of Australian listed firms had an audit committee in 2002 (R. Lim, 2011 ). An audit committee plays a key monitoring role to ensure the validity of a company's internal control, integrity of financial reporting and audit process. In line with agency theory, the audit committee's monitoring function will lead to improved disclosure quality (Ho and Wong, 2001) .
H3: There is a positive relationship between the presence of an audit committee and the level of voluntary ICD.
The nomination and remuneration committees are regarded as essential tools of good CG under the Australian and NZ Corporate Governance codes. The nomination committee undertakes succession planning, determining the quality of appointed directors, and the remuneration committee determines and reviews the nature and amount of all compensation for senior offices in the company (Ho and Wong, 2001 ). They are therefore directly related to the skills and networks that the directors offer and the stakeholders which they best represent. It is argued that the presence of these committees will enhance IC in the firm and the disclosure of IC to diverse stakeholders. Boards of directors engage the firms' auditors and these external audit firms have a significant influence on the amount of information disclosed by firm management (Bassett et al., 2007) . Big 4 audit firms have greater incentives to maintain their quality and protect their brand name reputation (DeAngelo, 1981) and this enables them to influence clients to provide greater information in their corporate financial reports to satisfy external users' needs (Hossian et al., 1995 Data on the variables of interest (see Table 1 ) for these 228 companies was obtained from the OSIRIS database, and company annual reports.
Dependent Variable
The 2009 Australian and NZ annual reports were examined for ICD 12 . They were indexed to form a new database that could be used in the ISYS search engine. As in other ICD studies (e.g. Abhayawansa and Guthrie, 2014) , a content analysis technique was used to measure the dependent variable. Content analysis is 'a method of codifying the text of writing into various groups or categories based on selected criteria. It assumes that the frequency indicates the importance of the subject matter' (Guthrie et al., 2006, p.287) . As promoted by Dumay and Cai (2014) , this study modified traditional content analysis, by using a computerised word search technique 13 . A panel of three NZ experts (one Electronic word searches increase sample size over that of manual content analysis studies but because the annual report is not read for meaning, some ICD may not be captured. Note: † robustness measure for BDCOMP The ISYS search engine was then used to search electronically for the keywords one at a time in the annual reports. Each hit was examined separately to ensure that it was related to IC and was in the sections of the annual report that ensured it was a voluntary disclosure 14 . If these criteria were met, it was considered to be a 'valid' disclosure and was coded 1, otherwise zero. Those coded zero constitute false positives and were disregarded for the analysis.
The major underlying weakness of content analysis is the subjectivity involved in the coding. To counteract this, rigorous stability and validity tests were undertaken to ensure that decisions regarding the identification of positive word hits were applied consistently over time and by a second researcher. Krippendorff's alpha (Krippendorff, 1980) indicated an acceptable level of reliability in coding 15 . Similar to Abhayawansa and Azim (2014), one measure of ICD was calculated, the extent of ICD, which was calculated as the total of 'valid' IC disclosures for each company. This approach focusses on the quantity of disclosure and treats the items with equal importance. It is recognised that it makes no comment on the relative importance or quality of the disclosures.
14
Repetitive and multi-items in a sentence were all recorded. Exclusions were pictures, tables, graphs, endnotes, sentences beside pictures and graphs, report titles and job titles. 15 Decision rules were developed during initial training on 3 annual reports. To test for stability over time, a test-retest procedure was used (2 annual reports were re-coded after coding every 10 annual reports). 90% of α scores were above +0.75 (minimum acceptable standard of reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999) ). Similarly, inter-rater reliability (second person coding 3 annual reports) was also at an acceptable level.
Independent, Moderating and Control Variables
CG information was obtained manually from the annual reports. Each company was classified by country of origin, with NZ companies coded as 1 and Australian companies as 2. The country variable was initially included as an independent variable in the model (see Section 3.4) and then as a moderating variable in order to test H 7 .
Following the prior literature, three control variables were included. These consisted of firm size, which is consistently found to have a positive significant relationship with ICD (e.g. Haji and Ghazali, 2013; Oliveira et al., 2006). Larger firms are expected to disclose more than smaller firms as they are better resourced and able to do so, in order to reduce information asymmetry and political costs associated with their higher visibility (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . Total asset data was obtained from OSIRIS and standardised in $NZ using the exchange rate at balance date. Including size also controls for a potential omitted variable problem Using prior literature as a guide the companies in the sample were divided into either high-intensity ('hightech') or low-intensity ('low-tech') technology groupings on the basis of their Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) category 16 . The third control variable was CEO-Chairman duality. Agency theory suggests that allowing the CEO to also serve as the chairman on the board could impair the board's oversight and governance roles, including disclosure policies (Li et al., 2008) . CEO duality has been associated with more limited disclosure (Bassett et al., 2007) and CEO entrenchment, resulting in ineffective monitoring and a consequent increase in opportunistic behaviour (Li et al., 2008) . In contrast, stewardship theory maintains that the executive manager essentially wants to perform well rather than act opportunistically and that duality should lead to superior company performance as it permits clearcut leadership in strategy formulation and implementation. Empirical results between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure are mixed, with some studies finding a negative relationship (Bassett et al., 2007) and others concluding that CEO duality is not a significant determinant of ICD (Hidalgo et al., 2011) . CEO duality is relatively rare in Australia (R. Lim, 2011).
Model
The regression model tested is:
4. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2 . Most data was not normally distributed.
Australian firms disclosed significantly more IC than NZ firms (p= 0.000), and also in all three IC sub-categories 17 . This may be due to Australia's higher ranking on the OECD, stronger economy and the likelihood that these businesses have more IC to disclose. Australian annual reports were also on average significantly longer than NZ annual reports 18 .
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There were 48 high-tech and 66 low-tech firms in each country. High-tech industries consist of chemicals, aerospace, defence, electrical equipment, professional and educational services, healthcare, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, information technology, software and computers, communication, electronics and semi-conductors and telecommunications. Low-tech industries consist of energy, construction, mining, transportation, consumer and household goods, hotels, retailing, food, tobacco and utilities. Mean number of words/section of annual report examined were 6268 (Australia) and 4162 (NZ) (p= 0.01).
The average board size of 5-6 members is low in comparison to other countries 19 . NZ firms' board size was significantly larger than Australia's (p=0.000) but this generally meant only one more director in NZ. The vast majority of firms in both countries did not have CEO duality and did have audit and remuneration committees, indicating good governance practices. NZ companies chose Big 4 auditors significantly more often than Australian firms (p=0.000), possibly because Australia has more viable second tier audit firms than exist in NZ. Also, significantly more Australian firms had a nomination committee than NZ firms (p=0.05), perhaps due to the earlier adoption of CG principles. As the sample was matched on market capitalization and industry, there was no significant difference in firm size or industry between countries.
A comparison of 2004 20 and 2009 CG data for 77 pairs of the 114 Australian and NZ matched pair companies for which data was available, showed that CG had changed little over that period in both countries. There were some changes in particular measures but not all in the same direction. Initial indications of relationships between the independent variables and ICD can be gleaned from the correlation analysis (Table 3) . Two tailed tests demonstrate significant positive relationships (p=0.05) between ICD and board size, boards with a majority of independent directors (but not the proportion of independent directors), all three board committees, Big 4 auditors, country and firm size. Comparing ICD by the binary variables showed that ICD was significantly higher in firms with audit, remuneration and nomination committees, those with a majority of independent directors and Big 4 auditors (1% level) and low-tech firms (5% level). Combining these results indicates possible support for H 1 -H 6 and rejection of H 7 .
Regression Analysis
The individual country data was then pooled and tested using ordinary least squares regression analysis (OLS) without the country variable included 21 . The results are displayed in Column 1 of Table 4 . All the assumptions of OLS were met. There were some outliers but regressions with and without the outliers showed essentially the same results so the outliers were retained. Just over 20% of the variance in ICD was explained by the model, and the extent of ICD was significantly related to the presence of a nomination committee and the size of the firm (p=000).
Increasing independence of directors on the board was not related to the extent of ICD, but when the BDCOMP variable was replaced with the dichotomous MAJINDEP variable (Column 2 Table 4), a marginally significant positive relationship was observed (p=0.1) and the adjusted R 2 improved slightly to 21.1% 22 .
To test if country has a significant direct effect on this relationship, the COUNTRY variable was added to the regression. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 display the results, using BDCOMP and MAJINDEP as alternative measures of board independence. The addition of COUNTRY increased the explanatory power of the regression by 10%, with adjusted R 2 of 31.1% and 31.5% respectively. The COUNTRY variable was highly and positively significant indicating that Australia was a much stronger explainer of ICD than NZ, as indicated in the univariate tests. The nomination committee, which is more prevalent in Australia, continued to have a significant influence on ICD (p=0.05) but also board size had a significant positive effect. Again a majority of independent directors was a better explainer of the extent of ICD than proportion of independent directors. Firm size remained as a significant explainer of ICD, but notably CEO duality and industry did not.
Because of significant country differences in board size and nomination committee, and the relationship of these independent variables to ICD in the regression, interaction terms with country were calculated and added to the first pooled regression in order to test H 7 . Because of high multicollinearity between NOMCOM and NOMCOM*COUNTRY Table 5 . In addition the sample was partitioned by country and repeated without the interaction variables and these results are displayed in Columns 3-6 of Table 5 .
Firstly, the adjusted R 2 shows no improvement on the regression with the country main effect.
Secondly the results show that the presence of a nomination committee enhances ICD in both countries (p=0.1) but because nomination committees are more prevalent and established in Australia, their effect is more noticeable in that country 24 . This suggests that a specialist nomination committee that focusses on selecting directors with desirable human capital elevates the level of IC in the firm which is then communicated to various stakeholders.
Thirdly, the BDSIZE*COUNTRY interaction variable had a highly significant effect on ICD (p=0.000), but board size on its own was not influential. The individual country regressions demonstrated that increasing board size was important in Australia only and this may be due to the fact that Australian boards were slightly but statistically significantly smaller than NZ boards. In line with RDT, the increased skill set, resources and networks provided by a larger number of directors will enhance IC in the firm and IC disclosure.
22
There is also some support in the literature for a non-linear relationship between board size and ICD as excessive numbers of board members may have a detrimental effect on communication, commitment and decision-making (Hidalgo et al., 2011 Interaction variable is highly significant (p=0.007).
Again there is support for a board with a majority of independent directors influencing ICD (p=0.05), but this was not influential in either individual country.
As before, firm size had a significant positive effect on ICD but neither CEO duality nor industry impacted on this disclosure.
Additional Analysis
The data was also partitioned firstly by auditor and secondly by industry. The nomination committee continued to have a significant effect on ICD only for those firms audited by a Big 4 firm (n=170) and for low-tech firms (n=131).
Dumay and Cai (2014) called for other data sources to complement ICD content analysis findings. Accordingly, further insight was sought through sending a short open-ended questionnaire to the CFOs of two NZ companies in the sample. The questionnaire investigated the company's reasons for voluntarily disclosing IC, and the CFO's opinion of the influence of CG on ICD. Company A had strong CG measures, high ICD, and awards for its annual report, whereas Company B displayed lower ICD but still had strong CG measures.
The CFOs agreed that the amount of ICD was not directly influenced by the Board of Directors. Company B's CFO reported that the 'disclosures are generally determined by the CFO and CEO of the company' and that they 'only disclose what they have to'. Company A's CFO agreed that 'the form and content of the annual report is largely driven by management' however stated that the 'annual report is much more than a statutory requirement…it enables our communication to be open, honest and transparent'. This organisational emphasis on transparency in Company A, which possibly derives from the board, appears to translate into increased ICD.
CONCLUSION
This study examined the impact of CG on the voluntary disclosure of IC in Australia and NZ in 2009. It examined six CG variables, board size, board composition, presence of audit, remuneration and nomination committees, and Big 4 auditor, which were all argued to have a positive effect on ICD.
Of importance is the new finding that the nomination committee is a significant determinant of ICD in both countries. This relationship was stronger in Australia, which was endorsed by the significantly higher prevalence of nomination committees and significantly more extensive levels of ICD in Australia. These results support H 5 and do not support H 7 . Using RDT, it is argued that nomination committees focus on selecting quality directors who bring desirable human capital and resources to the firm (Abeysekera, 2010 Abeysekera (2010) . There was no evidence of a non-linear effect (Hidalgo et al., 2011) .
Thirdly there was some tentative support for H 2 . The study did not find support for the proportion of independent directors on the board influencing ICD but did observe a significant positive relationship between ICD and a majority of independent directors on the board. Codes of Corporate Governance are increasingly requiring a majority of independent directors on the board (Australian Securities Exchange, 2003) and this study demonstrated that this enhances ICD. This result concurs with RDT arguments as a majority of independent directors would bring wider skills, knowledge and networks and may take a 'disclosure position beyond an uncritical prescription to norms, to a more proactive position, reflecting the value There was no support for H 3 and H 4 . Most firms (91%) had an audit committee and 75% had a remuneration committee, so this lack of differentiation may contribute to the absence of any observed effect. However it may be more likely that the audit committee's focus is on its monitoring function with its accompanying mandated disclosure requirements.
Similarly the remuneration committee's concerns with top management compensation may be either privately sensitive or alternatively the subject of mandatory disclosure.
The multiple regression analysis also showed that the choice of auditor (Big 4 or not) was not a significant variable in determining ICD. H 6 was rejected. However further analysis indicated that Big 4 auditors appeared to support the nomination committee-ICD relationship. This is a worthy topic for future research.
This study makes three main contributions. Firstly it extends the literature by determining and comparing the specific facets of CG which promote voluntary ICD in Australian and NZ. Secondly it provides support for the relationship between board size, an independent director board majority and the presence of a nomination committee with ICD on the basis of resource dependency and stakeholder theory arguments. Thirdly, it utilises a computerbased word search to provide an increased sample size for this type of content analysis.
The findings have practical implications for accounting standard setters and regulators wishing to establish more detailed guidelines and rules to encourage the disclosure of IC. In order to increase ICD, NZ firms could concentrate on establishing nomination committees, whereas Australian firms could increase the number of directors on the board. The indication from the two questionnaires that boards may have indirect influence on ICD through their espoused corporate philosophy, is worthy of further investigation through a more extensive interview-based or questionnaire study. Methodologies 
